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When adopted in 1980, Superfund was a daring and promis-
ing new scheme to address a difficult environmental problem -
orphaned hazardous waste disposal sites. With Superfund now up
for reauthorization, it is incumbent to rethink the very founda-
tions of the law. Opinion is virtually universal that Superfund, af-
ter more than a decade, has fallen far short of its goal. Indeed, the
law might fairly be characterized as an "air ball."
Superfund was a reaction to the political crisis spawned by
high-profile media accounts of environmental disasters at Love
Canal and elsewhere. These media accounts not only portrayed
the prevailing risks as horrendous, they also identified the respon-
sible parties, who appeared quite blameworthy. Congress re-
sponded to public demand for correction of the problem and pun-
ishment of the guilty parties.
At its inception, and as interpreted by the Environmental
Protection Agency and early judicial opinions, Superfund bristled
with the threat of nearly limitless liability. Potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) were many; damages were strict, joint, and several;
and contaminated land was to be cleaned to nearly unnatural pris-
tineness.' Neither Congress nor EPA actually anticipated that this
* Professor of Business Regulation, University of Texas; J.D., 1980, Harvard; B.A.,
1977, University of Kansas.
** Senior Legislative Associate, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P., Washington D.C.;
J.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1989; B.A., Emory University, 1986.
1 In the early judicial interpretations of Superfund, the government established posi-
tive precedents on virtually every contested issue. On the issue of joint and several liability,
see, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). One government lawyer suggested
that Superfund requires only that he stand up and declare: "May it please the Court, I
represent the government and therefore I win." Douglas M. Garrou, Note, The Potentially
Responsible Trustee: Probable Target for CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv. 113, 113
(1991). While the pendulum appears to be swinging back to the side of defendants, the
fundamental precedents for a remarkably stringent liability regime have already been set.
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onerous regime would be applied with regularity. Rather, the the-
ory was that the threat of untrammeled liability would intimidate
private parties into surrender - meaning voluntary cleanup or
payment for government cleanup costs. This approach found sup-
port in the classical economic theory declaring that an increasing
likelihood of ever-stricter penalties will produce greater compli-
ance with law.'
The classical economic theory of compliance is being sup-
planted, however, by studies showing greater success for interac-
tive compliance. Industry is more likely to conform to government
wishes if the government approaches in a more conciliatory and
cooperative fashion.3 When government presents a threatening,
antagonistic face, the private response will more likely be one of
resistance. This is precisely what has occurred under Superfund.
Experience demonstrates that Superfund has required the ex-
penditure of enormous amounts of money in exchange for rela-
tively little benefit. Despite the highest of expectations, very few
hazardous waste sites have been cleaned up," and the economic
costs of Superfund have been huge. This is primarily due to the
substantial transaction costs of Superfund litigation in which at-
torneys, expert witnesses, and the like consume considerable re-
sources. 5 When cleanup has occurred, excessive sums have been
spent at one site, to the detriment of the thousands of other sites
deemed to require attention.6
The high transaction costs and limited accomplishments of
Superfund are directly attributable to the severe liability regime
applied under the original Act. Weakening of the law will func-
tionally strengthen it. While facially counterintuitive, this princi-
See FRANK B. CROSS, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE 2-5
(1993).
' See, e.g., Patrick Edwards, Choices that Increase Compliance, 10 POL'Y STUD. REV.
6 (1991-92); Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory
Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J. L. & ECON. 331 (1990).
1 See, e.g., JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLI-
ANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988); Frank B. Cross & Bill
Stapleton, Economic Determinants of Environmental Compliance, INDUS. & ENVTL. CRISIS
Q. (1994).
' See, e.g., Frank Viviano, How Superfund Became a Mess, S.F. Chron., May 30,
1991, at Al (indicating that only 33 of ten thousand sites have been cleaned up in more
than a decade of statutory experience).
See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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pie has been plainly demonstrated by game theorists and other
analysts.
This article proposes to strengthen Superfund through two
major changes. First, the law's liability language should be diluted
through the elimination of presumptive joint and several liability.
The liability of individual PRPs should be limited to that portion
of the problem that they caused, as estimated by the best availa-
ble methodology. Second, the standards for site cleanup should be
relaxed, with official policy settling for reasonably clean
conditions.
I. APPORTIONED LIABILITY
Joint and several liability was controversial from the first
days of Superfund. The criticism of such liability centered on its
unfairness, because a single company responsible for only a small
fraction of harm could bear financial responsibility for an entire
site.7 Defenders of the liability scheme have acknowledged a level
of inequity but justify the approach as necessary for an effective
cleanup program.8 History has demonstrated, however, that joint
and several liability has not succeeded in this goal.
Intended for use as a bludgeon against recalcitrant private
parties, the existence of presumed joint and several liability has
served only to promote greater recalcitrance. The existence of un-
necessary Superfund transaction costs is beyond dispute, and these
costs are largely attributable to the law's onerous liability regime.
The great expenditures on litigation and associated transaction
costs have undermined the environmental benefits of the law.
President Clinton recently observed that he would "like to use
that Superfund to clean up pollution for a change and not just pay
lawyers." 9
A series of efforts have been made to quantify the wasteful
litigation costs associated with Superfund. A Rand Corporation
I The joint and several liability scheme of CERCLA was criticized as casting too
broad a net of liability and unfairly requiring contributors responsible for only a part of the
contamination to bear the entire cost of cleanup. 126 CONG. REC. 26,756 (1980) (state-
ment by Rep. Stockman). See also Frank P. Prager, Apportioning Liability for Cleanup
Costs under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 198 (1986-87).
8 126 CONG. REc 31,965 (statement of Rep. Florio arguing in favor of the application
of joint and several liability under CERCLA).
I See Leslie Cheek IlI, Salvaging Superfund Insurance Industry, BEST'S REv. PROP.
CASUALTY INS. EDITION, June 1993, at 65.
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study found that on average about 32 percent of Superfund ex-
penses were attributable to legal fees or other non-cleanup ex-
penses, with this proportion rising to 60 percent at some sites.1
Another study found that some 21 percent of potentially responsi-
ble parties' expenditures went to non-cleanup expenses, such as
litigation costs."1 An Office of Technology Assessment study esti-
mated transaction costs at 44 percent of total expenditures. 2 For
major insurers, transaction costs amounted to 88 percent of
Superfund expenditures.' Legal costs are running between $10
million and $20 million per Superfund site.14 About $12 billion
has already been consumed in transaction costs, and Jan Acton,
Rand Corporation researcher, estimated that the ultimate total
could be $200 billion.' 5 These financial costs do not even include
the substantial costs (both health and financial) associated with
lengthy delays in cleanup.'"
High costs associated with the operation of Superfund are di-
rectly related to the act's liability standards. The Rand Corpora-
tion's research on Superfund transaction costs attributes those
costs to a "litigious atmosphere" and an "adversarial relationship"
between government and potentially liable parties. 7 This situation
is largely a result of "joint and several liability, [which] sets up a
tension between the EPA and the parties, as well as among the
parties themselves, at a time when the EPA might also prefer to
have cooperation and expeditious handling of a site.'
18
Others also identify joint and several liability as a central
culprit in the litigious situation surrounding Superfund. Professor
Daniel Mazmanian and David Morell's classic study of Superfund
observed: "Because under strict joint and several liability, anyone
10 See Superfund Spending Ills Detailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1993, Zone M, at 4.
1 See Non-Cleanup Costs Plague Insurers, PRPs, ENGINEERING NEws-REC., May
11, 1992, at 18. See also Michael Weisskopf, Superfund Spending Inquiries Set, WASH.
POST, June 20, 1991, at A4.
Is Frank Viviano, Superfund Costs May Top S&L Bailout, S.F. CHRON., May 29,
1991, at Al.
Is See Mark Trumbull, Costs of Superfund Lawsuits Stir Up Calls for Change,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 1992, at 7.
" Dennis Conolly, Comments on "Cleanup of Old Waste: Some Thoughts on Re-
thinking the Fundamentals of Superfund," I I RISK ANALYSIS 69 (1991).
SViviano, supra note 12.
Litigation is one of a number of factors that have substantially delayed site
cleanup. On average, it takes eight years to begin remedial work. JAN PAUL ACTON, UN-
DERSTANDING SUPERFUND: A PROGRESS REPORT viii (1989).
7 Id. at 53.
11 Id. at 54.
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involved can be held accountable for the entire cleanup costs,
businesses (and most recently municipalities) have devoted an
enormous amount of energy to fighting EPA and one another
through the legal system rather than contributing to the cleanup
task."1 The U.S. Treasury Department concurs, finding that joint
and several liability "creates enormous economic uncertainty"
that in turn produces "inflated transaction costs."20 A leading
commentator observed that "the high-stakes Superfund liability
system breeds protracted negotiation and litigation, which, in
turn, entail significant [transaction] costs."21 Counsel for DuPont,
a frequent defendant in Superfund actions, expressly blames joint
and several liability for "an avalanche of wasteful litigation. '"22
The situation is so bad that one Florida state official noted that
listing a site under Superfund could "actually be counterproduc-
tive in achieving cleanup of the site."23
Elimination of the presumptive joint and several liability
standard will create a more equitable, and potentially more coop-
erative, atmosphere under Superfund and consequently will enable
more revenues to be directed toward actual cleanup. In addition,
there is not a material downside to eliminating joint and several
liability. The standard has proved a failure in pressuring poten-
tially responsible parties to undertake voluntary cleanup, and
EPA's very limited success in recovering monies for the cleanup
fund further testifies to the lack of need for joint and several lia-
bility." Elimination of joint and several liability also would add
fairness to the operation of Superfund.
25
11 DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S Tox-
ICS POLICY FOR THE 1990s 221 (1992). The authors further note that firms willing to pay
their share of cleanup costs were deterred from doing so by the "fear that once involved,
they would inherit the entire cleanup cost." Id. at 36.
10 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY:
SUPERFUND LIABILITY ISSUES 2 (Aug. 24, 1993).
" Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability
Scheme, 21 ENVTL. L, REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413, 10,414 (July 1991).
2 Glenn Hess, It's Been Super Fun, Not Superfund, CHEM. MKTG REP., November
16, 1992, at SRl4.
" MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 19, at 37.
ACTON, supra note 12, at viii (government has recovered only about $230 million of
cleanup expenses). These recoveries amount to only about ten percent of government
cleanup expenses. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Commentary
on the Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 430 (1992).
" One commentary has proposed the retention of joint and several liability but the
elimination of strict liability under Superfund. MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 19, at
229. While this would ease the stringency of the statute, it could increase transaction costs
1993-94]
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The elimination of joint and several liability would necessa-
rily mean some form of apportioned liability, in which each de-
fendant pays for cleanup in proportion to its share of responsibil-
ity for the site. This system presents some unique prospects for
additional litigation, as parties haggle over their respective per-
centages of responsibility. Fortunately, the potential problem of
additional litigation is surmountable.
There exist several simple approaches to apportionment. The
most commonly used method in settlements is simple volumetric
shares, in which each party contributes to cleanup costs in propor-
tion to the amount of wastes they sent to a site. More sophisti-
cated models would also consider factors such as the relative tox-
icity of these wastes. One established basis for apportionment, the
"Gore factors," includes whether a party's contribution of hazard-
ous substances to a site can be determined, the amount of the con-
tribution, and cooperation with regulatory agencies. The scheme is
named for Vice President Al Gore, who proposed the criteria
while serving in Congress. 6
To avoid litigation over the proper apportionment approach,
Congress should authorize EPA to establish by regulation a pre-
sumptive basis for apportionment of cleanup costs to be employed
in all but exceptional circumstances. This approach has already
been taken by Superfund for purposes of valuation of natural re-
source damages17 This apportionment could then be applied by an
Administrative Law Judge in a Binding Apportionment of
Liability.
The abolition of joint and several liability will eliminate the
in terrorem threat to potentially responsible parties but in the pro-
cess will provide greater predictability and fairness to cleanup cost
damage assessment. This result will promote greater cooperation
and less incentive for delay and litigation. Such an atmosphere
will, in turn, produce more site cleanup at less overall cost.
as parties embark on the difficult task of proving or disproving the negligence of long past
acts. Moreover, the counterproductive effects of joint and several liability would remain to
induce litigation and other delays.
2 Then-Representative Gore provided six factors for apportionment in an amendment
to the original Superfund that failed to pass. See 126 CONG. REC. H9461 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 1980).
27 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. 9607(f)(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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II. REASONABLE CLEANUP STANDARDS
In addition to the onerous liability standards, the problems of
Superfund are compounded by the demand for excessive
cleanup--the "how clean is clean?" issue. Intuitively, it might
seem that "cleaner is better." Insistence on purity, though, raises
the costs of cleanups and thereby further induces recalcitrance by
potentially responsible parties. Excessive cleanup efforts also di-
vert resources from other sites and reduce the number of sites that
can be addressed.
The task of site cleanup poses a difficult technical and politi-
cal question: At what point will the Superfund program regard a
site as truly clean? The question is complicated by an essential
tension within the Act. While Superfund professes to embrace the
concept of fast-paced remediation with joint and several liability,
its choice of unrealistic goals by which to evaluate success creates
extraordinary costs that undermine the incentive for timely settle-
ment by potentially responsible parties.
Few limitations exist on the solutions that may be adopted by
EPA pursuant to Superfund remediation. Few citizens, other than
PRPs, are willing to step forward and speak for the proposition
that anything less than maximum technological feasibility should
limit remediation. For example, Superfund encourages community
involvement in remedy selection.2 8 Unless the municipality itself is
a PRP, however, there is little incentive for a community to com-
promise. To the affected community, the provision of cleanup ser-
vices is a free good of great value, and local communities have no
real need to economize or accept a level of safety deemed reasona-
ble under principles of risk assessment. The pressure of the local
community, in turn, is transmitted to EPA decision makers when
they evaluate technological standards .2  The burgeoning waste
management industry also has weighed in as a potent lobby for
costly solutions.
28 Under CERCLA, the Comptroller General must conduct "a study of options for
post-closure programs," CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. 9607(k)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
considering, inter alia, that "members of the public [should] have reasonable confidence
that hazardous wastes will be managed and disposed of safely." 42 U.S.C.
9607(k)(6)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. TV 1992).
2" Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests and
Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS. PRIVATE REWARDS 67, 70-71
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992).
1993-94]
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Another factor tending to force the statute toward the most
comprehensive solution possible is the strict liability system. Be-
cause the priority of Superfund is establishing blame, and not sim-
ply effective environmental protection, it is subject to extensive lit-
igation concerning the appropriateness of remedy selection. Under
such circumstances, there is no logical "end-point" for regula-
tion-a concept that forces extraordinary results. Other laws per-
mit the luxury of selecting a technological solution appropriate to
the regulatory standards. With Superfund, consultants must de-
vise solutions that not only protect human health and the environ-
ment, but that also anticipate inevitable litigation concerning the
question: How clean is clean? 0 This produces added delay and
transaction costs, as Mazmanian and Morell observed:
Without specific guidance as to remedies, those PRPs wishing to
settle in advance of EPA's selection of a remedy have no reliable
way to evaluate their financial exposure. Thus, PRPs, EPA, and
state and local agencies continue to engage in study after study
at a site, with each participant often trying to amass new data to
buttress its claims regarding the extent of cleanup desired (and
the costs incurred). Any hope for remediation gets pushed aside
while debates rage, seemingly without end, over how much
cleanup is necessary to protect health and how much cost can be
justified to clean the site."'
Like an ancient theological dispute, the question of "how clean is
clean" seems almost metaphysical, but it has implications for suc-
cessful implementation of the Superfund program that are all too
real. By escalating the costs of remediation, "gold-plated" reme-
dies have slowed cleanups to a glacial pace. Only 64 actual clean-
ups have been completed - and at a cost of $7.5 billion. 2 EPA
estimates that the average cleanup cost is about $25 million per
site, ranging as high as $100 million.83 Not including govern-
ment's own hazardous waste sites, the Office of Technology As-
sessment has estimated that cleaning up all known hazardous
10 George Lobsenz, Peterson: Superfund Isn't Broke, It Never Worked, 6 ENVT'L
WK., July 1, 1993, at 4 (interview with Ralph Peterson, president and CEO of CH2M
Hill, one of EPA's largest Superfund cleanup contractors).
" MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 19, at 45.
12 FRANCIS CAIRNCROSS. COSTING THE EARTH 223; MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra




waste sites could cost as much as $500 billion over the next half
century.3'
Even though the threat of draconian liability has had some
benefit in changed behavior, Superfund's inability to articulate
reasonable solutions has seriously undermined the system. EPA's
first General Counsel, John Quarles, concluded that if we continue
to seek Superfund solutions that restore sites to essentially pristine
conditions, we will be disappointed:
It might take us centuries to achieve that goal at all Superfund
sites, and practical compromises with it are becoming common-
place. The philosophy of utter purity is, however, still intact as
the driving force that governs the program. 35
In practice, Quarles has characterized cleanup as meeting the
"picnic standard," meaning that cleanup should continue "until
one could hold a picnic on top of the dump site where people could
in total safety breathe the air, drink the water, and eat the dirt.""0
In place of utter purity, there are more reasonable premises upon
which to base Superfund's cleanup standards.
At the risk of committing the heresy of using common sense
in environmental protection, it would seem obvious that superior
cleanup results could be achieved if absolute risk reduction were
replaced with a format designed to match the greatest resources to
the greatest risks. Of course, this end cannot be achieved with pre-
cision. There would be improvement if EPA employed exposure
and toxicity data to perform risk assessments for Superfund sites.
EPA presently uses the queue system, whereby sites ready for
remediation obtain completed "picnic standard" cleanup before
work commences on the next site. This should be replaced by an
approach known as ubiquitous risk reduction. The goal of this pro-
gram would be to make some progress on each site, rather than
complete progress on a few sites determined by their position in
the queue. The state of Pennsylvania uses this ubiquitous risk re-
duction approach. The approach has been criticized for its lack of
gold-plated solutions. The Environmental Law Institute has found
that the approach achieves greater true risk reduction, however,
because:
34 Id.
11 John Quarles, In Search of a Waste Management Strategy, 5 NAT. RES. & ENV'T
3, 48 (Summer 1990).
s8 Id. at 48.
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It emphasizes cleanup activity over study. It emphasizes atten-
tion to geographical and social diversity in conducting cleanup
activities. It emphasizes eliminating those risks that can be most
practically and immediately eliminated, and it targets the avail-
able resources.
37
The approach also parallels that suggested by the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment.8 8 By increasing the range of remediation
alternatives and the flexibility at a given site, a more accurate and
useful risk orientation will be equally protective and more
democratic.3 9
CONCLUSION
Despite high, wasteful costs and the slow pace of cleanup, it
would nevertheless be wrong to assert that Superfund has entirely
failed to advance environmental protection in the United States. It
is fair to say that the statute has produced far less progress than
promised, and much of the responsibility for statutory shortcom-
ings can be laid at the feet of some of Superfund's best friends.
By pressing for pristine cleanups and severe liability, environ-
mental advocates have inadvertently undermined the ends of
Superfund. Remedying these excesses could produce the opposite
of a "Catch-22" with greater cleanup and more health protection
at less cost. A somewhat meeker Superfund would be more effec-
tive. Those opposed to such an outcome would only be lawyers
who benefit from transaction costs and those advocates more de-
voted to theatrical posturing than to actual environmental protec-
tion. While these parties have real political influence, Congress
should reject their pleas and reauthorize a new, improved, and ef-
fective Superfund.
1' James M. McElfish Jr. & John Pendergrass, Environmental Law Institute Re-
search Brief No.2, in REAUTHORIZING SUPERFUD: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 5 (Decem-
ber 1993).
" OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 8-9 (1985). The
OTA also observed that "[plursuing a strategy of cleanup levels on the basis of background
or pristine chemical levels does not make environmental, technical, or economic sense." Id.
at 119.
"' At a recent meeting of the National Advisory Council on Environmental Policy and
Technology, John Sawhill, a former EPA Administrator and current president of the Na-
ture Conservancy, remarked that the goal of public health protection can vary depending
on the desires of the surrounding community. "Some will want economic development;
some will be concerned about the health effects." 21 PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS
3 (July 28, 1993).
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